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IN- THE SUP'REME CO,URT
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD R. CRITTENDEN
Plaintiff,
vs.
THJD INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, D. & L. CONSTRUCTION
COMI' ANY, and THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Case No.

12117

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STA'TEMENT OF FAOTS
The recital by the plaintiff in his Statement of Facts
is aecurate, in the main, in the description of the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses. It is respectfully
submitted, however, that the defendants should submit
the following Statement of Facts in order that this Court
may have before it the version of all of the witnesses that
appeared before the Industrial Commission:
At the onset it should be pointed out that the critical
issue before the Industrial Commission and argued before
this Court is one of medical causation in which there was
a sharp divergence of medical opinion and the Industrial
1

L'msuant to the provisions of 35-1-98 U.C.A. 1953,
;1;.: awcnd0d, the initial treating physician, who \Vas pre,,,,nt nt tlw sctme of the accident, Dr. Reed J. Parker, filed
l1is r<>port with the industrial Commission (R. 2). This
report mentioned no difficulty to the applicant's back
nm1 corroborated the fad of November 18, 1963 as being
thr• day in which Mr. Crittenden would he able to return
to work. \Vithout any imputation to Mr. Crittenden\_;
"!,!,Tit'' it should be pointed out that other than two con'ultations with Dr. Parker immediately subsequent to
the aceident, the applicant failed to confer with or see
mff vh.n.;ician until the summer of 1966 when he returned
to Jh. Parker, who referred him to a specialist, Dr.
Ste\\att A. \Vright (R. 35).
ln plaintiff's brief great detail was spent in describiJ1g; tl1P trauma that was connected with the accident of
'.'\nn·rnlwr 'G3. The plaintiff does state, however, in his
Crittenden was brought to his home in an
brief that
ambulance and was "laid down in the back part and was
taken to his home" (Plaintiff's Brief, page 4 ). At one
ol' tlw many hearings on this matter, that is, on the third
hearing held on August 31, 1967, the plaintiff called as
his witness Robert M. \X,Talker, who is a. funeral director
in Coalville and also runs the ambulance service (R. 143).
Mr. W alhr specifically stated that Mr. Crittenden was
lrnnsported to his home sitting up, rather than lying
down (R 144:). Mr. Crittenden also informed the medical
paiw l that this was the case ( R. 272). Subsequent to the
U('ci<font the plaintiff worked as steady as his employment
('onditions allowed and, in fact, worked for five months
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Commission lwli''V('d the testirnony "-hich was contn11
to that given by be plaintiffs' treating vhysician.

It was admittt•d that the State Insurance Fund
the earrier for th0 partnership of D. & L. Conl:ltructi1,
Company in ?\ ovember of 19G3 and that the ap11licaltl
suffered an accident within the course and scope of
employment (R. 10). In fact, the defendant, '11he
Insurance Fund, paid for the cornriensation requester!
during the year 196;) by the plaintiff-applicant (R. GI
rrhe State Insurance Fund, however, denied liability fnr
the surgery to Mr. Crittenden's hack which was performed by Dr. Stewart A. Wright on August 11, 19(i6 (R 1
57), some thirty-thn-'e months suhsequrnt to the induftrial accident. In August of 'GG Dr. ·wright performed a
laminectorny on "a protruded disk on the right side be- 1
hYeen the 5th lumbar verteba and the top of the sarnun''
(R. 57).
11

'l'he plaintiff, Mr. Crittenden, since ]ip was a partnl'r
of D. & L. Construction Company, filed with the Industrial Conunission of Utah an ernplo;·er's report of injury
which showed that he returned to work on the 18th day
of November, 1963, some two days after the accident (R.
l). As such, there was no claim for loss of wages in thr
form of temporary compensation. In fact, in the cover
letter to the State Industrial Commission counsel for thP
plaintiff specifically stated that the plaintiff made no
claim for loss of wages prior to the surgery, that is, dming the thirty-three month interval between the date of
the accident and the date of the operation (R. 3).
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flyo memlwrs of the medical panel felt differently, that

that tlwre was no medical causation between the accidPHt and the resulting surgery and disability. The Commission in all of its orders recognized this difference of
opinion between medical doctors and, in fact, in both
orders, and in partieular the most recent order (R. 319
to :-):24:) tlw Commission sets forth the actual testimony
as to tlw disagreement between the doctors. The Corrunission believed those doctors that testified that there ·was
no causal connection and from that finding the plaintiff
takPs his appeal in this case.
'l'lw initial panel and the testimony supporting the
same found that there was no causal connection based upon the follo\\·ing facts:
"l. The panel is unable to relate the condition

that necessitated surgery by Doctor Wright
to the accident of November 16, 1963, for the
following reasons :
(a) The interval between the accident and the
development of symptoms necessitating
definitive treatment was quite long (two
and nine-twelfths years.)
(b) The applicant apparently required limited treatment immediately following the
accident and was able to work at least in
a supervisory capacity within two to
three days, saw the doctor only twice, and
no x-rays were taken or felt necessary by
the treating doctor.
(c) The applicant operated heavy equipment
for several months at a time for at least
three different employers and did not re5

for vV. vV. Clyde in the 01wration of heavy equipnwnt.
He did not miss any work during this period of time and,
in fact, worked nine hours a day, five days a week and
also ·worked for J\forrison-Knudsen operating hean
equipment for some seven months and working approxi.
mately eight to nine hours a day. During this pPriod of
time the applicant did not miss any ·work nor lose any '
wages as a result of his physical condition (R. 37, 38 and
300). 'l1he applicant also testified that he felt during tlt8
first six months immediately subsequent to the accident
that his physical condition was improving (R. 36) and
what prompted him, Mr. Crittenden, to see Dr. Parker in
the swnmer of 'GG was when he felt pains in his legs which
were different than any discomfort he had experienced
before (R. 37).
All parties recognized, the plaintiff in his briPf un
page 14, the Hearing Examiner in his initial order (R.
24), the Industrial Commission in its final order, that the
issue presented was stated by The State Insurance Fund
in the initial hearing (R. 10 and 11) as follows:
"The only issue here is purely a medical panel question; that is, whether or not the accident
that occured November of 1963 is what occasioned the applicant's present difficulties, inc-lu<ling his recent surgery."
In regard to this issue, and through the numerous
hearings had in this matter, it is clear that the plaintiffs
treating physician felt that there was a causal connection
between the '63 accident and the '66 surgery and that
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Jl!llns trial Cornmi ssion should l)e
and modified.
ln tliis n·gard it is fundamental that the findings of the
htdnsfrial Cormnission on conflicting medical testimony
cannot Le disturbed on appeal. As early as 1924 the
rtah
Court in Cwnpbell v. Eagle and Blue Bell
M111i11g Com1JC111y, 64 Utah 4:30, 231 Pac. 620, stated succintly tlw approach to be taken in cases of this kind, as
follo\\·s :

"1-'he testimony· taken before the Commission
consi8ts entirely of the opinions of medical experts with the exception of the testimony of the
applicant, Campbell. This tt'sti1aon)· is conflicting.
We can see nothing in this record for review excPpt the findings of the Commission based upon
conflicting testimony. The testimony was com1wtent and material to the issues to be determined
by the Commission, and on that testimony the
Commission made its findings. This court, in provePdings of this character, is without power to disturb the findings of the Commission based upon
cornpetent conflicting testimony. The statute so
provides, and the court has so decidPd in nm11Prous
opinions. It is wholly immaterial that this court,
or the individual members thereof, might have
come to a different conclusion than that reached
hy the Commission. The Commission's fimdings

are binding when supported by competent, material testimony." (Emphasis added).
rrlierefore, the question of whether or not Dr. Stewart Vfright's testimony should be believed is not the propPr question to be determined upon appeal. The issue is
\d1ether or not the Industrial Commission acted in an arhitrary and capricious manner. This Court has pointed
out recently in Vause v. lndustrial Commission, 17 U. 2d

7

quire (or seek) medical treatment until
approximately August 19G6.
( d) The only x-rays of the patient's lurnbosacral spine and pelvis were taken by
tliis panel and show an obvious degene;._
ate disk at the L5 level that, because of
cfogree, probably predates the injuri."
(R. 7±).
.
As outlined herein, the fads that the }Janel relied
upon as the bases for its decision, as delineated above,
sustained by the record and, in fact, is uncontrovrrted.
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON
THE COlVIl\USSION'S ORDER IS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND IN FINDING AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS INSTANCE THE COMMISSION DID NOT
ACT IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER.
ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND IN FINDING AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS INSTANCE THE COMMISSION DID NOT
ACT IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER.

In reviewing the record in this matter before the Industrial Commission and the plaintiff's brief, it appears
that this appeal is based on the fact that thi::-; Honorable
Court should believe the expert testimony of causation
of the plaintiff's treating physician as versus the opinion
of Dr. vVallace Hess and Dr. Norman Beck. It is respC'ctfully submitted that the plaintiff is rearguing this factual
question to this Court and is nrt,ring that Dr. Wright's
opinion is more persuasive and as such the order of the
6

"I think I can explain this, and it will help.
May I state that I have read the objection and
you infer that the panel implied that Stewart
vV right may have not performed the best surgery
on this patient. The panel did not wish to imply
this, .... "
Tlwre is no evidence that a disagreement on how the
oprration \Yas perfom1ed in any manner affected the deeision of the panel. The plaintiff, however, urges on page
16 of his brief that this made a difference in that the panrl stakcl:

"3. The applicant has not reached a fixed
state. He has had a simple disk excision, the degenerate disk remains, and prognosis is guarded.''
(R. 74, 75)
Dr. Hess explained the reason that the panel made
this finding. He stated at page 275:
" ... This man was eight months. He lacked 18
inches of touching the floor. He was still having
some pain, and to our knowledge wasn't working,
except in a supervisory capacity.

-

"The reason this was put in was just to simply indicate that he hadn't reached a maximum
improvement, and he wasn't ready for rating.
That is all that implies.
"MR. MOORE: Q. In other words it is a
practice of Panels - as I understand, from your
testimony - that, even if the Panel feels there is
no connection between the accident and the resulting disability, that the Panel in many instances
attempts to assign a percentage of disability; is
that correct¥
"A. That's correct.
9

217, 407 P. 2cl 1006, that our "statutory ancl decisional
law req nire us to look at the evidence in the light mo 8t
favorable to the Commission's finding and it is the obligation of the parties involved to so present thP matter
to tlu-• Court." It is suggested, therefore, that the plaintiff in this case in quoting at length from his doctor' 8
testimony is reargning a factual question that has been
ddennined by the Commission and has set no basis for
this Court to find that the Conrmission acted without
powt>r and authority.
The initial problem the plaintiff presents is the l\Olllposition of the medical panel. It is argued that there is a
difference between the avprnach of an orthopedic surgeon and a neurosurgeon. There is no doubt that within
both medical specialties they perform operations to the
back to solve the problem of a herniated disk. The orthopedic surgeon in relieving a person of the difficulty of a
lwrniated disk performs an operation which is lmown as
a "fusion". That is, an operation where that partienlar
joint or vertebra is put out of commission by fusing the
two surrounding vertebrae. A neurosurgeon in correcting
a herniated disk performs a "laminectomy". That is, he
rt>mOVl'S the pa1·t of tlw disk that has been released from
the capsule and allows the joint to be operable. (R. 270)
This difference in operative approach in no manner affected the decision of the panel because it is admitted by
all that surgery was essential in August of 1966. The
only issue presented is 1yhether or not the cause for surgery wa:::; due to the industrial accident that occured in
November of '63. Dr. Hess made this point quite clear
when he 8tated, as followl'> (R. 98):
8

did. not, at
I operated him, require a
fus10n. And m discussing the possible surgery
that could be done with Mr. Crittenden, he felt
that he would prefer that a fusion not be done ....
"And the further statement is: ' ... and prognosis is guarded.'
''Prognosis means 'outlook for the future.'
\Vell, it could be that at sometime in the future
"Mr. Crittenden will have or will need a fusion
done. And so one could very reasonably say that
the prognosis is guarded. I have no objection to
that." (R. 169, 170)
It would appear, therefore, that the implication that

tlw iiand should be disqualified because they found that
the applicant had not reached a fixed condition at the
time of examination by the panel is not supported by the
n·eord. rrhis is particularly true in light of the fact that
enn the treating physician corroborated the fact that
the avplicant had not reached a fixed condition at the
tirne that the panel examined him.
The plaintiff contends that the medical conclusion
of no 11wdical causation was not based upon credible evidenee. Dr. Hess testified on numerous occasions that it
was his opinion as a matter of medical probability that
therP was not a causation. For example, see the Comllltf;Hion 's orders of April 30, 1970 (R. 319, 324).
Dr. Hess based his opinion that if the accident in
qiwstion would have caused tlw rupturing of the disk,
that it would be his position that the applicant could not
haw carried on in the capacity that he did for nearly
three years (R. 108) and that it would have been impos11

.
And one does
assign a percentage of
d1sab1hty unless the condition is peaked, or reach.
ed a fixed stage; is that
"A. Correct.

"Q. And were you responding to that practice, in your comnwnts in the Panel Report, in this
"A. vVe were."
From the foregoing testimony it can be seen that Dr.
Hess in stating in the panel report that the applicant had
not reached a fixed state was simply informing the Industrial Commission pursuant to the practice of panel'
that the applicant's condition vrns such that tlll'l'l'
couldn't he a permanent partial rating. There was no
attempt to impute that the operation was improper and
that the panel was penalizing the applicant for seeing a
neurosurgeon. Even plaintiff's witness, Dr. Stewart
vVright, agreed with the position of the panel in this ngard and took no exception to this conclusion. Dr. Wright
testified as follows:
"A. I read No. 3: 'The applicant has not
reached a fixed state.'
"Now, let me answer that part of the statement first if I may. In my opinion, this is correct. It is now a little more than a year since the
man was operated, and he is still impro.
Hence, the state is not fixed, and we will hope
that he will improve to the point of being
well insofar as this back and this protruded disc
is
But he may not. Once in awhih•) after a so-called simple disc excision, a patient will
later require a fusion. In my opinion, this man
10

( d) reports of employers, including copies of
sheets, book accounts or other records·

'

( e) hospital records in the case of an injured
or deceased employee." (Emphasis added)
As such, these reports are admissible punmant to
specific statutory authority. See Uta-Carbon Coal Company u. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 P. 2d
G+9, c:ited with approval in Hackford v. Industrial Oom1mssion, 11 U. 2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899. As such, the reports
of Dr. Parker which are found in the record at R. 2 and
R 38 are admissible. Plaintiff introduced a report from
Uie treating physician (R. 240) and it appears inconsistent for him now to argue that said reports are inadmissible.
As stated at the onset of this discussion, it appears
tl1at the plaintiff is urging upon this Court the fact that
the testimony of Dr. vV right should be believed as oppmied to the testimony of the panel doctors.
35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, reads in part as
follows:
"The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be conclusive
and final and shall not be subject to review."
The testimony of the medical doctors was competent
an(l as such the issue of whether or not they should be
believed is totally immaterial on this appeal. See McTVilliams v. Industrial Commission, 21 U. 2d 266, 444 P.
2<l 513; Garner v. Hecla Mining Compa'Yl1J, 19 U. 2d 367,
-131 P. 2d 794.
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sible, in his opm10n, for the applicant to have overate!]
heavy equipment during t1w period in question if, in f'ar·t.
the November 13, 19G3 incident caused a ruptured diik
(R. 132). The record is replete with competent tetitimonv
that there was no connection between the accident in N1;_
vember of 19G:-3 and thP surgery in 196G. See R. 90, 01,
100, 108, 116, 120, 122, 263, 266, 277, 280 and 304.
'l'lw next issue that the plaintiff has rail'ed
the fact that the panel took into consi(leration that
the initial physician, Dr. Parker, failed to take x-ray:,
or hospitalize the applicant in arriving at its e-ondu
sion that the initial trauma was not particularly significant. 'l1he fart of the matter is that the applicant test
ified that Dr. Parker did not take x-rays and, of eouw,
the panel properly took into consideration this matter
when examining the extent of the trauma in November
of 1963. Basically, it appears that the i1laintiff is complaining that Dr. -Wright's reports should not have been
considered because they are heresay. At this jlllcture
it should be noted that 35-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
provides in part as follows :
"The Commission may receive as evidenC€
and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but
not limited to the following:
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings;
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pat ho lo gists;

( c) reports of investigators appointed by the
Commission;
12

CONCLUSION
There was a sharp disagreement hetween the opinion
of tlw treating physieian and the opinion of the medical
panel. 'Che Cornmjssion believed tlw opinion of Doctorn
Hess and Beck and plaintiff cannot reargue a factual
question at this point, and as such tlw Connnission's
order should be snstain0d.
Rt>s1wctfully subrni tted,

ROBFJRT D. l\lOORE
Attorney for dPfendants
D. & L. Construction Company
and rrhe State Insurance Fund
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